This paper focuses on market discipline as a necessary condition to preserve the signaling content of balance sheet indicators and market prices as macroprudential tools. It argues that market discipline enhances the information content of market prices by reflecting the expected private cost of financial distress, including the systemic importance of particular firms. This paper also argues that three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions' risk profiles; financial institutions' creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals needs to be observable. The paper relies on the existing financial literature and it is particularly timely because policymakers are considering structural measures of banks' systemic importance as a benchmark for macroprudential policy.
Introduction
The present financial crisis, whose epicenter was in the most sophisticated financial markets in the United States and the European Union (EU), has tested the national and international preparedness to deal with financial instability. 1 In their quest to ensure financial stability, governments launched bail-outs that have been costly for taxpayers and have prompted policymakers to review a wide range of policy areas including monetary policy, prudential supervision and resolution of failed financial institutions. In this context, central banks´ macro prudential policy has attracted particular attention. Although the theoretical and empirical literature is still in its very early stages, there is a consensus among policymakers that the main objective of macroprudential policy is to reduce systemic risk and enable the continuous functioning of the financial system, without costly bail-outs for taxpayers. In contrast to microprudential policy, macroprudential policy takes into consideration risk factors that go beyond individual financial institutions, including shock correlations and interactions between institutions in their response to shocks. The macroprudential approach relies on the notion that "risk" is endogenous.
For the purpose of this paper, systemic risk is defined as the risk of a widespread crisis in the financial system. Other definitions also highlight the impact on the real economy.
IMF/BIS/FSB (2009) define systemic risk as "a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy." Systemic risk is a negative externality that policymakers need to tackle via macroprudential regulation.
The only recent academic and policy literature on the operational framework of macroprudential policy has focused on crisis prevention and not on crisis management (Borio and Drehman, 2009 ). The present paper challenges Borio and Drehman´s view that crisis management policies are not pre-emptive in their orientation and are relevant only when the crisis has unfolded. Their view neglects the preventive policy aspects of failed bank resolutions that aim at minimizing the aggregate credit and liquidity losses to the financial system by allowing markets to continue functioning. Supervisors´ prompt corrective policy together with banks´ mandatory contingent convertible bonds and a credible resolution regime if an institution is clearly insolvent, and ideally combined with bail-in approaches, contribute to preserving not only financial stability but also the information content of market signals.
This paper focuses on market discipline as a necessary condition to preserve the signaling content of balance sheet indicators and market prices as macroprudential tools. It argues that market discipline enhances the information content of market prices by reflecting the expected private cost of financial distress, including the systemic importance of particular firms. This paper also argues that three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions´ risk profiles; financial institutions´ creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals needs to be observable. The analysis relies on the existing financial literature and it is
1. No generally accepted definition of financial stability exists. See Padoa-Schioppa (2003), Schinasi (2004) and Goodhart (2009) ; these definitions emphasize the robustness of the financial system to either external shocks or shocks originated within the financial system and the sources of systemic risk for which there is a consensus definition.
particularly timely because policymakers are considering structural measures of banks´ systemic importance as a benchmark for macroprudential policy.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section one elaborates on the necessary conditions for effective market discipline and analyzes its role in enhancing the information value of market indicators. Section two briefly comments on the use of market and balance sheet indicators in macroprudential policy as measures of the systemic importance of financial institutions and risk indicators of financial instability. The last section concludes and presents some policy recommendations that focus mainly on three aspects of market discipline: reorganization and resolution of failed financial institutions; accounting frameworks; and supervisory disclosure and financial information gaps. Effectiveness of market discipline in its supporting role of macroprudential policy: Preconditions for effective market discipline
Neither policy makers nor academics have paid much attention to the supporting role of market discipline in macroprudential policy in spite of the fact that, at this point in time, macroprudential policy importantly relies on market prices and balance sheet indicators as measures of systemic importance and future financial distress. Academics often assume that market prices reflect all the available public and private information. However, a macro prudential framework that relies on market prices only assumes that markets are informationally efficient, hence, the importance of transparency and disclosure in the effective functioning of a market discipline regime. The underlying rational is that disclosure allows counterparty surveillance and makes markets more efficient in the sense that they embody the knowledge that market participants have. However, disclosure is only one condition for the effectiveness of market discipline. Disclosure provides investors with the necessary information to assess the risk that they will have to bear including the possibility of losses, and that promotes better risk pricing. Market discipline could be understood as higher rates on liabilities associated with higher risk, which reduces the risks taken by banks. In sum, it is the expectations that financial costs will have to be borne that makes market discipline work.
The effectiveness of market prices and balance sheet indicators as measuring tools of systemic importance and financial distress rests on the presumption that markets can be relied upon to exert discipline on risk taking of financial institutions. Market indicators have the advantage of being available frequently (mostly daily) for financial institutions that tap funds from the markets and that makes them particularly useful in macroprudential policy. Since the 1990´s, policy makers have stressed the role of market discipline as a pillar for a safe and efficient financial system. However, the crisis has considerably weakened policy makers´ reliance on market discipline, interestingly enough, in part, as a result of their intervention. Large market failures that occurred in the run up to the financial crisis were caused to a substantial extent by an inappropriate institutional framework that made bail outs of financial institutions inevitable. Three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions´ risk profiles; financial institutions´ creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals needs to be observable.
Adequate and timely information on financial institutions' risk profiles:
In Against this background, Huizinga and Laeven conclude that replacing the mixed model of accounting based on both amortized cost and fair value with a model based entirely on fair value accounting would mitigate incentives for accounting arbitrage and could serve to 2. These authors consider the timeliness and accuracy of the information in the supervisory and market assessments but they do not consider its costs. Their study assumes that information is costless. 3. Bank supervisors do not always enforced timely recognition of losses as suggested by Eisenbeis and Wall (2002) in the context of the implementation of Prompt Corrective Action in the US.
improve the information value of public accounts. However, the effectiveness of capital requirements depends entirely on the proper valuation of assets and liabilities and the timey recognition of impairment. In times of crisis, market prices are driven by liquidity provision incentives and not fundamental values; hence, an accounting framework that entirely relies on mark-to-market values is not adequate to assess the solvency of financial institutions as a "going concern." However, accounting standards and regulatory standards have different objectives and goals. Most important is that prudential regulators are accountable for explaining deviations from accounting standards. Publication of stress tests could be an ex ante accountability mechanism. Also, for the sake of transparency for markets and policy makers, market prices could be supplemented with both model-based and amortized cost valuations in financial crisis situations.
Both prudential supervisors and market participants also rely on the availability of sufficient and comparable information in order to comprehensively and accurately assess both the systemic importance of financial institutions and the signals of financial distress. Financial information needs to be comparable in terms of valuation criteria for assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items. 4 Moreover, because macroprudential policy takes into consideration shock correlations and interactions between institutions in their response to common shocks, financial information on "interconnectedness" and "substitutability" is necessary. Regarding "interconnectedness" among financial institutions both domestically and internationally, the most obvious data gaps are the information on the detailed composition by asset type of the "trading" and "available for sale" assets´ portfolio; detailed information on the lending to and borrowing from banks and non deposit financial institutions; and the information on the counterparties of credit lines and other offbalance sheet items. Regarding "substitutability", the obvious data gaps are the value of assets for which banks act as custodians, the values and shares of large value payments settled by banks and the values and shares of global securities settled by banks.
This information is of utmost importance for macroprudential policy makers, but financial institutions would be reluctant to publicly disclose it out of competitiveness concerns.
To the extent they do not embed market views about "interconnectedness" and "substitutability," market prices would only partially reflect credit risk, limiting their usefulness as macroprudential indicators. Nonetheless, policy makers could use private information on "interconnectedness" and "substitutability" to supplement market prices as indicators of systemic importance of financial institutions and signals of financial distress.
Financial institutions´ creditors must consider themselves at risk and the reaction to market signals needs to be observable
The disciplinary role of markets requires allowing for failure of individual institutions within the context of a credible resolution regime that limits its wider impact both in the financial sector and the general economy, while also limiting moral hazard. In order to fulfill these objectives, the absolute priority of claims needs to be protected so that shareholders need to be first in taking losses and creditors know ex ante the repayment priority (Hart, 2002) . It is for this reason that a number of legal scholars have argued for reliance upon traditional bankruptcy statutes or, at least, special laws designed for banks, which still include some involvement of the Courts of Justice in the actual insolvency procedures rather than the bank closure model in approaches establishes mandatory write downs of banks´ Tier 1 non common equity and unsecured debt at supervisors´ discretion at the point of non viability. In the Hart and Zingales proposal, the loss absorption capacity applies to all "non-systemically relevant"
obligations (e.g. long-term debt). These approaches are better suited to deal with tail risks.
To the extent that triggers are based on market signals, such mandatory requirements under a rule-based regime together with a credible resolution process for failed institutions would provide the adequate incentives to shareholders and uninsured creditors to engage in risk analysis and act consequently (see Table 1 ). 
Market prices and balance sheet indicators as measuring tools of systemic importance
One facet of systemic risk is the propagation of adverse shocks through the rest of the financial system (and the real economy). The failure of some financial institutions considered systemically important can create systemic risk. The ideal measure of systemic importance must capture the potential spill overs or contagion effects from the institution whose systemic importance we want to measure to the rest of the financial system. Such measure is of utmost importance for macroprudential regulation whose main objective is that systemically important institutions internalize the costs that their failure imposes on others including the costs associated with moral hazard. However, measuring systemic importance faces mainly two methodological challenges: (i) the time dependence character of systemic importance and (ii) the difficulty to separate the externalities that the failure of a large firm can cause on the financial system (spill overs) and the externalities associated with common exposure to a common shock (common exposure effects). These challenges render the ex ante assessment of systemic importance very difficult. Goodhart refers to the "fuzzy outlines of the definition of systemic importance."
6. As per the ECB definition of credit institutions, it includes the credit institutions incorporated under the law on any EU country regardless whether or not they are subsidiaries of foreign banks but excludes foreign branches of EU and non EU banks.
Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to measure systemic importance 
Market prices and balance sheet indicators of financial instability
The main objective of macroprudential policy is to limit systemic risk by reducing the probability of financial distress occurring. The effectiveness of macroprudential measures of financial instability depends in part to the extent that they are "leading" measures of financial distress (Borio and Drehman, 2009 ). In order to be useful as forward looking indicators, balance sheet indicators need to be incorporated into a model of the dynamics of financial instability. Rating agencies use these publicly available balance sheet indicators to elaborate their own assessment of the strength of the financial system as a whole that is intended to be forward looking to the extent that ratings are not "sticky" because they use methodologies based on "through the cycle" PD. 8 The measure of strength of the financial system is the bottom up aggregation of each financial institution individual rating. Hence, this measure does not take into consideration the interconnections between financial institutions and potential domino effects. In fact, one of the main challenges that macroprudential policy makers face is that the market discipline of potential bank failure and creditors´ loss absorption apply both to small but also to large and complex institutions, while still avoiding systemic risk. Precisely, Financial information needs to be sufficient and comparable in terms of valuation criteria for assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items since the definition of a systemically important institution is global. This demands convergence between accounting standardsetters over global accounting rules. Because macroprudential policy takes into consideration shock correlations and interactions between institutions in their response to common shocks, financial information on "interconnectedness" and "substitutability" among financial institutions -including non-banks -is necessary. Such information could reveal strategic decisions, and managers could be reluctant to provide it to the market out of concern over competitiveness.
As compared to markets, prudential supervisors have a comparative advantage in making the disclosure of private information by financial institutions obligatory. Policymakers could use this private information on "interconnectedness" and "substitutability" to supplement the signaling content of market prices.
Prompt corrective action by supervisors limits the probability of systemic spillover to the extent that market participants can fully anticipate policymakers´ reaction. Moreover, by allowing markets to continue functioning, prompt corrective action and a credible resolution regime also preserve the information value of market indicators. In the case of liquidation, the absolute priority of claims needs to be legally protected. In such a regime, creditors know ex ante the repayment priority. All of this challenges the view that crisis management policies are only relevant when the crisis has unfolded and, hence, they are not pre-emptive in their orientation and as such outside the scope of macroprudential policy. Such a view neglects the preventive policy aspects of crisis resolution. These policy recommendations are not intended to be an all-encompassing list of reforms to improve the information content of market prices and balance sheet indicators.
Other aspects that demand policy attention and would result in enhanced market discipline are, among others, moving key markets to organized exchanges where possible, improving the transparency of OTC markets and, in general, reducing incentives in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage.
